

Ludwig Wittgenstein's Later Turn: Language as Lived Practice

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<p>Received: 29 Sep 2022; Received in revised form: 24 Oct 2022; Accepted: 27 Oct 2022; Available online: 31 Oct 2022</p> <p>©2022 The Author(s). Published by International Journal of English Language, Education and Literature Studies (IJEEL). This is an open access article under the CC BY license (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).</p> <p>Keywords— Wittgenstein, language-games, forms of life, rule-following, practice, later philosophy, anti-representationalism</p>	<p><i>This review critically analyses Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a significant shift away from representationalist views of language, moving toward understanding linguistic meaning as rooted in forms of life. By examining the evolution from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations, it synthesizes recent interpretations that see Wittgenstein's ideas of language-games, rule-following, and private language as primarily focused on practice. The article contends that his later approach provides a solid framework for redefining meaning not as an internal representation but as a public, embodied activity. Engaging critically with both analytic and continental perspectives, the review highlights how viewing Wittgenstein as a philosopher of lived practice opens new avenues in philosophy of language, social ontology, and cognitive science. It concludes that his emphasis on practice prefigures key themes in contemporary enactivism and pragmatism, making his work a lasting resource for anti-representationalist theories.</i></p>

Introduction

The course of Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical evolution remains one of the most debated areas in twentieth-century philosophy. Early interpretations often divided his work into two incompatible parts—the logical atomism of the *Tractatus* and the ordinary language philosophy of the *Investigations*. However, recent scholarship has developed a more nuanced understanding of the continuities and differences that define his intellectual development [1]. The research reviewed here, titled “Ludwig Wittgenstein's Later Turn: Language as Lived Practice,” challenges this debate with a bold thesis: that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy should not be seen as a theory of language, but rather as an invitation to move beyond mere theory to focus on language as a form of embodied, social activity. This review contextualises that research within broader Wittgenstein scholarship, assesses its contributions relative to other interpretations, and considers its implications for

ongoing discussions in philosophy and the human sciences.

Wittgenstein's distinctive shift is often summarised by his preface in the *Philosophical Investigations*, where he admits to having realised significant errors in his early work, shaping how scholars interpret his philosophy [2]. According to this view, Wittgenstein initially aimed to clarify language's logical structure with the picture theory of meaning, then shifted to a more therapeutic approach, dissolving philosophical confusion rather than systematically theorising. However, as Stern's research shows, this clear-cut division can be misleading [3]. The later Wittgenstein continued to engage with the concept of language's limits, but he saw these limits as arising from language use in specific contexts, not just from logical form. The current research builds on this idea, suggesting that Wittgenstein's “later turn” is better understood as a deepening of his anti-metaphysical stance, now expressed through detailed ethnographic descriptions of language-games.

The following literature review identifies three main interpretive trends that have shaped the field since the posthumous publication of the *Investigations* in 1953. The first, linked to the "resolute reading" promoted by Diamond and Conant, highlights Wittgenstein's therapeutic goals and his rejection of ineffable metaphysical claims [4, 5]. Resolute interpreters claim that the *Tractatus* contains the origins of its own transcendence, with the later works merely expanding this self-critical approach. The second trend, exemplified by Kripke's influential analysis of the rule-following paradox, views Wittgenstein as presenting a skeptical argument about meaning and offering a community-based solution [6]. Although Kripke's interpretation has been highly productive, it has faced criticism for ascribing to Wittgenstein a form of social reductionism that conflicts with his anti-theoretical stance. The third approach, championed by Cavell and successors, examines Wittgenstein through ordinary language philosophy, focusing on how we determine correct language use and the shared forms of life that support such judgments [7, 8].

All three strands of the research review highlight a notable omission: the lack of a sustained focus on the practical nature of linguistic competence. It emphasises that speaking a language is more akin to acquiring a skill or mastering a technique than simply following explicit rules. This omission is surprising, given Wittgenstein's frequent use of analogies involving games, crafts, and bodily activities. As Moyal-Sharrock has noted, Wittgenstein's concept of "primitive" or "bedrock" practices implies that linguistic understanding is fundamentally about acting rather than merely knowing [9]. The research elaborates on this idea, suggesting that Wittgenstein's later work prefigures key themes in twentieth-century pragmatism and enactivism. Interpreting Wittgenstein as a philosopher of lived practice enables dialogue with thinkers like Rorty, Brandom, and Noë, who aim to naturalize meaning without reducing it solely to representation [10, 11, 12].

The importance of this interpretive shift goes beyond Wittgenstein studies. If language truly is a form of lived practice, then the common view of meaning as mental images- what Wittgenstein called the "Augustinian picture"- must be replaced with one that emphasises embodiment, social interaction, and environmental context. This shift has significant effects on the philosophy of language, which has long struggled to move past the propositional bias from Frege and Russell. It also urges cognitive science to pay closer attention to the pragmatic aspects of human

communication, moving beyond the computational models that have dominated since the cognitive revolution. This review critically examines the main claims of this research, considers how it engages with opposing views, and evaluates its role in ongoing debates.

Language-Games and the Critique of Representation

At the core of Wittgenstein's later philosophy is the idea of the language-game. The research being reviewed interprets this not just as a teaching tool but as the foundation of an anti-representationalist view of meaning. The *Investigations* begins with a quote from Augustine's *Confessions*, where the young Augustine depicts language learning as matching words to objects. Wittgenstein quickly and sharply counters: this view assumes language's only role is naming, and understanding is simply connecting words to their referents. Instead, Wittgenstein introduces the metaphor of a builder's language, where words like "slab," "pillar," and "beam" are not labels but moves within a cooperative activity [2, §2]. This example is more than a rebuttal to Augustine; it serves as a model for seeing language as action rooted in practical activities.

Moving from representation to practice has significant methodological implications. While representationalist theories see meaning as a relationship between words and the world, Wittgenstein's language-game approach considers meaning as a function of use in rule-based activities. As Baker and Hacker have carefully shown, Wittgenstein does not propose an alternative theory of meaning, like a use theory, but instead dissolves the need for any theory altogether [13]. The question "What is meaning?" itself stems from philosophical confusion, as it tries to find a single essence where none exists. This review supports this therapeutic interpretation, adding that Wittgenstein's focus on language-games aims to bring us back to the concrete reality of everyday language, where meaning isn't hidden but shown through the usual ways we speak, act, and respond.

Critics of the language-game approach have raised several objections, and the research addresses the most significant of them. First, there is concern that Wittgenstein's focus on games trivializes language by making it seem like just arbitrary conventions. For example, Searle has argued that the analogy of language as a game downplays its important function of representation, which can't be fully explained through social practices alone [14]. The research

responds by differentiating between constitutive rules, which could always be different, and regulative rules, which guide our actual language use. Our real language-games are shaped by our way of life, including our biology, environment, and shared interests. This isn't a step back into naturalism like Quine's view, but it does ground language practice in something more substantial than mere convention.

Secondly, some argue that the language-game approach cannot explain the creativity of language—the ability to produce and understand new sentences. Chomsky's critique of behaviorist views on language is particularly relevant here: if meaning is merely use, then how do we account for our capacity to generate and understand utterances never heard before [15]? The research clarifies this by differentiating Wittgenstein's descriptive method from any form of linguistic behaviorism. Wittgenstein does not deny that speakers have internal capacities; he only rejects the idea that these capacities can be fully reduced to explicit rules. For Wittgenstein, following a rule isn't about consulting an internal representation but about acting in ways others recognise as appropriate. This view aligns Wittgenstein more with modern skill-based theories of cognition than with behaviorism.

Third, and most importantly, the research addresses the criticism that Wittgenstein's anti-representationalism is self-undermining. The objection states that if all language-games are equally valid, then Wittgenstein's own philosophical language-game has no authority over the views it challenges. The resolute reading of Wittgenstein responds by arguing that he is not proposing doctrines but providing therapeutic interventions to free us from the urge to philosophize [5]. However, the research finds this response insufficient, as it appears to shield Wittgenstein from real critique without clarifying why his methods should be convincing. Instead, it suggests that Wittgenstein's critique of representation functions as a form of practice—an approach to using language intended to change how we speak and think. The effectiveness of this practice is measured not by its alignment with some metaphysical truth but by its ability to resolve philosophical puzzles. This pragmatic approach, the research argues, aligns fully with the anti-representationalist principles of the later philosophy.

Rule-Following and the Social Character of Normativity

Few aspects of Wittgenstein's later philosophy have been scrutinised more thoroughly than his views on rule-following. In the *Investigations*, he presents

interconnected arguments claiming that rule-following cannot be understood through mental representations or private interpretations. If a rule is merely another sign, then interpreting it would lead to an endless regress. Wittgenstein proposes that rule-following is a practice: to follow a rule is to act correctly according to a community's standards, not to rely on an inner representation [2, §201]. Kripke interpreted these ideas as presenting a skeptical paradox about meaning: no fact about how someone previously used a term determines its meaning, since any finite history of usage allows for infinitely many possible interpretations [6]. The skeptical view relies on community agreement: what justifies answering "125" to "68 + 57" isn't a prior intention, but the community's shared acceptance of that response.

The review questions Kripke's interpretation on several points while recognising its historical importance. Firstly, Kripke incorrectly ascribes to Wittgenstein a skepticism about meaning that he never explicitly endorsed. The *Investigations* does not claim that facts about meaning are unknowable; instead, it argues that seeking such facts is based on a mistaken view of what meaning actually is. As McDowell noted, the regress argument is not a skeptical paradox but a *reductio ad absurdum* against the idea that rule-following necessitates interpretation. The true alternative is understanding that rule-following is inherently direct: we simply proceed without needing justification. Secondly, Kripke's dependence on community agreement risks reducing to a simple form of social conventionalism, where whatever the community accepts is considered correct. This approach would impede criticism and render mistaken rule-following unintelligible. Wittgenstein, however, emphasises a normative distinction between correct and incorrect applications, rooted in practice rather than mere representation.

The research offers a different perspective on rule-following, focusing on the concept of training. Before someone can explicitly follow a rule, they must undergo training within a community's practices. This training does not mean memorising explicit rules but involves shaping behavior through examples, corrections, and reinforcement. As Cavell points out, this training depends on a shared way of life and a common background of agreement in judgments, reactions, and responsiveness [7]. The normative authority of rules comes not from explicit agreements or shared intentions but from mutual accountability. The study also includes recent insights from

developmental psychology and social cognition, providing empirical support for Wittgenstein's idea of training: children learn language not by internalizing rules but by participating in joint activities, receiving feedback, and gradually acquiring the practical skills that constitute linguistic competence [17].

The research carefully avoids overstating the community's role. Wittgenstein stresses that community agreement is not the foundation of correctness but its standard: we see it as evidence that we've correctly followed the rule if others would respond in the same way. This indicates that the community might be mistaken, or an individual could be right even if the community is wrong. The research emphasises Wittgenstein's discussion of "natural reactions" to illustrate this: our basic responses to the world- such as pain-behaviour, pointing, and looking- are not conventional but pre-linguistic. These reactions provide a stable reference point for our language games without requiring justification [9, 18]. Moyal-Sharrock further elaborates this view into an explanation of "bedrock certainties," which are the hinge around which our practices turn.

Following these rules fosters a sense of practical holism rather than scepticism: normativity is understood not as a strange relation to abstract entities or merely a projection of community norms, but as an integral part of human practices rooted in our embodied, social way of life. The study shows this perspective aligns with key themes in Brandom's inferentialism, where meaning relies on the roles expressions play within normative social practices [11]. However, Wittgenstein differs from Brandom by not pursuing systematic reconstruction; instead, he offers prompts rather than comprehensive theories. This methodological approach is advantageous, as it respects the diverse nature of language-games and prevents the imposition of a single normative system on them.

The Private Language Argument and the Impossibility of Inner Ostension

No aspect of the *Investigations* has generated more debate than the private language argument. The reviewed research offers a unique perspective focusing on the importance of practice. The argument challenges the idea of a language where words refer only to private sensations and experiences accessible solely to the speaker. Wittgenstein argues that such a language is impossible because these private sensation terms would lack criteria for correctness. If I cannot verify whether I am using "pain" to refer to the same sensation each time, then there is no real difference

between seeming to use it correctly and actually doing so. When this distinction vanishes, the concept of correctness and, consequently, the idea of meaning also disappear [2, §258].

Traditional perspectives on the private language argument often emphasise epistemological or metaphysical issues- such as our supposed inability to know other minds or reduce mental states to observable behaviour. Nonetheless, this research views both interpretations as misunderstandings of Wittgenstein's aims. Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist nor attempting to refute skepticism regarding other minds. Instead, he questions a particular notion of inner experience essential for reference. The Augustinian view of language, when applied to sensations, posits that we look inward to link words with objects. However, inner pointing isn't genuine pointing because ostension depends on a public context to be meaningful. As McGinn observes, Wittgenstein's concern is with grammar, not empirical facts: the private object concept is incoherent because it disrupts our ability to discuss sameness and difference.

This research's unique contribution is its reinterpretation of the private language argument through the lens of practice. If meaning relies on use within public language-games, then a private language would be a practice only one person could engage in. Since practices are inherently social, involving norms, criteria, and potential correction, a solitary practice isn't truly a practice, just as a private rule isn't really a rule: there's no real difference between following it and just pretending to follow it. This does not mean sensations are irrelevant to language; instead, sensation-language is a specialised part of our public language game, learned from natural pain expressions like groans, winces, and cries, which are then shaped into linguistic forms. As Wittgenstein states, "The verbal expression of pain replaces crying, does not describe it" [2, §244].

The research critically analyses recent attempts to defend the coherence of private language, including Fodor's arguments for a language of thought and Block's support of qualia [20, 21]. It contends that these defenses share a common mistake: they view the private language problem as an empirical matter related to inner experience, rather than a conceptual issue about how meaning is created. No empirical data about the brain can resolve the private ostension problem because the core issue is not a lack of access to inner states but the failure of the inner-naming concept in the absence of a public context of use. This

does not deny the reality of inner experience but questions the idea that it can serve as the foundation of linguistic meaning, as the Augustinian view claims.

The private language argument supports the idea that language is fundamentally a shared, public activity, aligning with later philosophy. This idea is relevant to current debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. If Wittgenstein is correct, attempts to naturalize intentionality through inner representations, whether neural or computational, face the same private language challenge. Such representations are only genuine within a public framework of interpretation and correction. Hutto and Myin's research on radical enactivism advances this argument, challenging traditional representationalist views in cognitive science [22]. While they support enactivism, their work also cautions against seeing Wittgenstein as a full naturalist. Wittgenstein's approach remains descriptive, aimed at clarifying understanding rather than providing causal theories of cognition.

Forms of Life and the Limits of Practice

The idea of "form of life" (*Lebensform*) appears only infrequently in the *Investigations*, yet it has garnered significant scholarly interest. Wittgenstein references the term at key points: "What has to be accepted, the given, is one might say forms of life" [2, p. 226]. The analysed research considers the concept of form of life as the ultimate backdrop of Wittgenstein's practice-oriented philosophy- the context in which language-games are conducted and rules observed. Unlike culture or world-picture, which can differ among communities, a form of life pertains to shared biological, social, and practical conditions that enable language itself. As Garver has noted, form of life is Wittgenstein's way of countering relativism: although language-games are diverse and sometimes incommensurable, they are not purely arbitrary because they are grounded in common human needs, activities, and natural responses.

The research critically analyses various key interpretations of the concept of form of life. The anthropological perspective, linked to Winch, views form of life as a culture-dependent framework of understanding: what makes sense within one form of life may not be meaningful in another [24]. This perspective has been influential in social sciences, supporting a methodology that aims to interpret unfamiliar practices on their own terms. However, the research finds this approach somewhat incomplete because it neglects Wittgenstein's emphasis on the natural history of humanity. We are not just cultural

entities; we are also biological beings who share reactions like pain, pleasure, and basic perceptual functions. These common responses form a shared foundation that prevents different forms of life from being entirely incommensurable.

The naturalist perspective, associated with P.M.S. Hacker, highlights the biological aspects of forms of life: humans share a common nature that influences possible language-games [13]. This interpretation appears more promising; however, it warns against oversimplifying forms of life as solely based on human biology. Wittgenstein's use of the natural is not meant to be reductionist but to emphasise that our practices are rooted in ways of acting that are not always justifiable. The research suggests a third approach, drawing from recent work by Rahel Jaeggi and other critical theorists, who see Wittgenstein as providing a non-reductive view of social normativity [25]. On this view, forms of life both enable and limit: they allow language-games to function while also restricting what can be meaningfully expressed or done.

The idea of 'form of life' carries significant ethical and political consequences, which are examined in the later parts of the research. If forms of life serve as the basis for understanding, then critiquing across these forms requires a careful approach. One cannot simply judge another practice using one's own standards and dismiss it; nor should one fall into relativism, where all practices are considered valid in their own context. Wittgenstein does not provide a clear method for cross-cultural critique, but his focus on natural reactions and shared human needs offers tools for arguing that some practices hinder human well-being. Drawing on Diamond's insights into the moral aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy, the research suggests that, despite his reluctance, Wittgenstein's later work allows for ethical reflection rooted in attentiveness to specific cases rather than universal principles.

The research also considers a common objection: that the idea of a form of life might reintroduce essentialism, which Wittgenstein's language-game approach aimed to avoid. If form of life is simply the given to accept, then haven't we shifted the philosophical issue from language to life itself? The response is that a form of life is not an essence but a boundary concept, indicating the limits of explanation without itself requiring explanation. Asking why humans have a particular form of life is not a philosophical question but an empirical one, addressed by evolutionary biology, anthropology, and history. Philosophy's role is not to explain a form of life but to describe the language-games it enables. This

humble view of philosophy's scope aligns with Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical perspective.

Engaging the Secondary Literature: Critical Reception and Future Directions

A thorough review of Wittgenstein scholarship must consider the extensive secondary literature accumulated over the past seventy years. This research situates itself within that body of work by critically engaging with key interpretive traditions and emphasising a practice-based approach. Here, we assess its contributions in relation to four prominent interpretive strands: the standard, resolute, communitarian, and therapeutic readings.

The standard reading, exemplified by the work of Kenny and Pears, treats Wittgenstein's later philosophy as a systematic theory of meaning grounded in use [26, 27]. On this account, the *Investigations* advances positive theses about language, mind, and action, albeit in a non-dogmatic style. The research finds this reading inadequate because it imputes to Wittgenstein a theoretical ambition he explicitly disavows. "We may not advance any kind of theory," Wittgenstein writes, "There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations" [2, §109]. Reading the latter philosophy as offering a theory misses the therapeutic dimension that distinguishes it from systematic philosophy. The research is not alone in this criticism; the resolute reading has made similar points with great force.

The resolute reading, championed by Diamond and Conant, goes further: it holds that the *Tractatus* contains no positive theses and is entirely a therapeutic exercise designed to show that the propositions of philosophy are nonsensical [4, 5]. The latter philosophy extends this therapeutic method, offering reminders that aim to dissolve philosophical problems rather than solve them. The research endorses many aspects of the resolute reading, particularly its emphasis on Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical commitments. However, it parts company with the resolute reading on two points. First, the research argues that the resolute reading's insistence on strict nonsense makes it difficult to explain how Wittgenstein's method can have persuasive force. If the propositions of the *Tractatus* are literally nonsense, then why should we take them seriously? Second, the research contends that the resolute reading underestimates the continuity between Wittgenstein's later work and the pragmatic tradition. While Wittgenstein was not a pragmatist, his emphasis on practice, use, and

consequences aligns him with Peirce, James, and Dewey in ways that the resolute reading obscures.

The communitarian reading, associated with Kripke and the later Wright, sees Wittgenstein's later work as offering a social perspective on normativity [6, 28]. While acknowledging the influence of this approach, the research contests its main claim: that community consensus underpins correctness. It clarifies that Wittgenstein's references to the community are methodological rather than metaphysical. We compare our rule-following with others' responses, but this does not mean the community's responses define correctness. Drawing on McDowell and the later Brandom, the research offers an alternative, non-reductionist view of social normativity that maintains the distinction between being considered correct and truly being correct [11, 16].

The therapeutic reading, which overlaps with but is not identical to the resolute reading, emphasises Wittgenstein's aim of curing us of philosophical confusion by showing how language misleads us [29]. The research fully endorses the therapeutic reading while adding a distinctive emphasis: therapy is itself a kind of practice, a way of working on ourselves through language. Wittgenstein's method is not merely critical; it is constructive in that it aims to transform how we speak and think. The research draws on recent work by Sluga and Kuusela, who have argued that Wittgenstein's later philosophy offers a positive vision of human flourishing as the achievement of clarity and the dissolution of philosophical anxiety [30, 31].

Looking ahead, the research identifies several promising avenues for future inquiry. First, there is the relationship between Wittgenstein's later philosophy and embodied cognition. The research calls for a more sustained dialogue between Wittgensteinian approaches to practice and the enactivist tradition in cognitive science. Second, there is the political dimension of Wittgenstein's thought. While Wittgenstein himself rarely wrote about politics, his concepts of form of life, language-game, and rule-following have been taken up by critical theorists and social philosophers. The research suggests that a properly Wittgensteinian social philosophy would be anti-foundationalist without being relativist, and would emphasise the primacy of practice over theory. Third, there is the pedagogical application of Wittgenstein's methods. If philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of language, then philosophical education should focus on cultivating attention to actual language use.

The research calls for experimental pedagogical initiatives informed by Wittgenstein's practice-oriented approach.

CONCLUSION

This review traces the main argument of "Ludwig Wittgenstein's Later Turn: Language as Lived Practice" by exploring concepts like language-games, rule-following, private language, and forms of life. Its key contribution is in presenting Wittgenstein not merely as a language theorist but as a philosopher of practice- one who sees meaning not as a relation between words and the world but as an achievement rooted in embodied, social activity. Challenging representationalist views that locate meaning inside the mind, Wittgenstein argues that meaning is shown through our actions, responses, and mutual accountability. Similarly, opposing conventionalist views that reduce meaning to social agreement, he emphasises that practice is based on natural reactions and shared forms of life. The study carefully balances these perspectives, offering an interpretation that avoids both reductionism and mysticism, as well as relativism and dogmatism.

This analysis has implications beyond Wittgenstein exegesis. In the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein's later approach marks a significant departure from the Fregean tradition that still influences the field. Instead of viewing propositions as the main carriers of meaning, Wittgenstein highlights the numerous ways language functions in everyday life: giving orders, telling jokes, expressing thanks, cursing, greeting, and praying. These language-games cannot be reduced to a single logical structure, and trying to do so leads to philosophical confusion. The research indicates that a genuinely Wittgensteinian philosophy of language should be descriptive rather than explanatory, focusing on the diversity of language-games without forcing a unifying theory. This is not a lack of rigour but an understanding that rigour in philosophy means clarity about phenomena, not the development of formal systems.

In cognitive science, Wittgenstein's later perspective challenges the dominant computational-representational approach since the mid-twentieth century. If language is seen as a practical activity, then linguistic skill cannot be simply modeled as manipulating internal symbols with explicit rules. Instead, language is better understood as a skill or capacity that is embodied, embedded, and enacted through real-time interactions with others and the environment. This view aligns with the enactivist

movement, which draws inspiration from Wittgenstein to develop anti-representationalist views of perception, action, and cognition. Although it does not fully endorse a naturalized Wittgenstein, this approach fosters constructive dialogue between philosophy and cognitive science.

In social and political philosophy, Wittgenstein's later work provides tools for understanding normativity without relying on foundational principles. Forms of life are not based on social contracts, transcendental rules, or divine commands; they are simply the practices we engage in and that define our social existence. Although this might appear to endorse conservatism through uncritical acceptance of existing practices, the research demonstrates the opposite: by denaturalizing practices, Wittgenstein reveals them as human constructs, subject to critique and change. Recognising that our form of life is contingent does not hinder critique; instead, it frees us from seeking impossible foundations. The research advocates for a critical practice that operates from within a form of life, using its resources to examine its exclusions, contradictions, and injustices.

The research has some limitations. While it engages extensively with secondary literature, certain areas could benefit from deeper exploration. The focused analysis of the resolute reading is thorough, but the growing body of work on Wittgenstein and enactivism is only briefly touched upon. Since the study centres on the *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein's later work on topics like certainty, color, and philosophy of psychology receives comparatively less attention. A full treatment would include *On Certainty*, where Wittgenstein's idea of "hinge propositions" challenges the practice-based approach to its limits. Additionally, the research's normative stance- favouring anti-representationalism, supporting enactivism, and welcoming critical theory- is stated but not convincingly defended. Future research could strengthen these positions by directly addressing the arguments of representationalist critics.

Despite some limitations, "Ludwig Wittgenstein's Later Turn: Language as Lived Practice" makes an important contribution to Wittgenstein studies and to broader discussions in philosophy and the human sciences. By emphasising practice, the research sheds light on aspects of Wittgenstein's thought that have been overlooked by overly theoretical interpretations. It shows that Wittgenstein's later philosophy is not a departure from the challenging questions of meaning and mind but a shift that addresses them by

considering the embodied, social, and historical nature of human language. For readers who find Wittgenstein difficult or confusing, this research offers a compelling entry point. For those already familiar with Wittgenstein, it offers a new view that questions traditional views. Additionally, for philosophers outside the Wittgensteinian tradition, it shows why Wittgenstein's later ideas remain a vital resource for understanding language, mind, and practice today.

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