Keywords
Wittgenstein, language-games, forms of life, rule-following, practice, later philosophy, anti-representationalism
Abstract
This review critically analyses Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a significant shift away from representationalist views of language, moving toward understanding linguistic meaning as rooted in forms of life. By examining the evolution from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Philosophical Investigations, it synthesizes recent interpretations that see Wittgenstein’s ideas of language-games, rule-following, and private language as primarily focused on practice. The article contends that his later approach provides a solid framework for redefining meaning not as an internal representation but as a public, embodied activity. Engaging critically with both analytic and continental perspectives, the review highlights how viewing Wittgenstein as a philosopher of lived practice opens new avenues in philosophy of language, social ontology, and cognitive science. It concludes that his emphasis on practice prefigures key themes in contemporary enactivism and pragmatism, making his work a lasting resource for anti-representationalist theories.
